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This paper provides new estimates of the global gains from multilateral trade reform and 
their distribution among developing countries in the presence of trade preferences. 
Particular attention is given to agriculture, as farmers constitute the poorest households in 
developing countries but the most assisted in rich countries. The latest GTAP database 
(Version 6.05) and the World Bank’s LINKAGE model of the global economy are 
employed to examine the impact first of current merchandise trade barriers and 
agricultural subsidies, and then of possible reform outcomes from the WTO’s Doha 
Development Agenda. The results suggest moving to free global merchandise trade 
would boost real incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa proportionately more than in other 
developing countries or high-income countries, despite a terms of trade loss in parts of 
that region. Net farm incomes would all rise substantially in that and other developing 
country regions, thereby alleviating rural poverty. A Doha partial liberalization could 
move the world some way towards those desirable outcomes, but more so the more 
developing countries themselves cut applied tariffs, particularly on agricultural imports. 
 
JEL codes: C68, D58, F13, F17, Q17 
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  The aims of this paper are threefold: to summarize the costs of current merchandise trade 
distortions to developing and other economies; to examine some scenarios that might emerge as 
part of an eventual Doha Development Agenda agreement, particularly with respect to 
agriculture; and to draw out implications for the strategies developing countries might adopt in 
the WTO’s Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations.   
  More specifically, the paper shows what the world economy could look like in 2015 
without and with a successful conclusion to Doha, how far Doha could take the world towards 
where it would be in the absence of all distortions to merchandise trade, and what contribution 
could be made by the various elements of a Doha package. For present purposes we make use of 
the World Bank’s recursive dynamic model  of the global economy known as LINKAGE (see van 
der Mensbrugghe 2004), which has formed the basis for the World Bank’s standard decade-long 
projections of the global economy and its earlier trade analysis (e.g., World Bank 2002, 2004). 
We also use the latest version (6.05) of the GTAP Database, which includes the tariff preferences 
enjoyed by many developing countries (see www.gtap.org). The distinction is made in our results 
between effects on developing countries as compared with more advanced economies, but in 
doing so it is necessary to take into account not only the World Bank’s country classification 
based on income level but also the self-nominated one practiced in the WTO (in which even 
customs territories as advanced as Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan claim 
developing country status and so are eligible for Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) 
including lesser tariff cuts and longer phase-in periods than what is eventually agreed for 
developed countries under Doha).  
Our analysis suggests most of the potential gains from multilateral reform are from 
agriculture but, because of huge gaps between WTO-bound and applied rates of protection, there 






developing countries – unless WTO Members are willing to make very substantial cuts to their 
bound tariff rates and domestic farm subsidy commitments. Without that, the gap between 
agricultural and manufacturing protection is likely to widen, as is the gap between developed and 
developing country protection rates, thereby limiting the welfare gains from reform to a small 
number of more-advanced economies. We therefore explore the effects of a more ambitious 
agricultural reform package, and of developing countries participating more fully in the Doha 
round rather invoking SDT to avoid reform. In both respects we show how much closer the 
world could get to exploiting the full benefits of trade if these more-ambitious reform 
commitments were to be made and implemented over the next decade.  
The paper begins with an overview of the key elements of a prospective Doha agreement, 
focusing especially on the agricultural elements. It then describes the model of the global 
economy to be used to analyze the consequences of such an agreement, and of alternative more-
ambitious reforms including a move to complete free trade (which provides a helpful 
benchmark). The estimates of protection and subsidy rates for each region are a crucial part of 
the data in the global model, and so they are examined before turning to the key results of the 
simulations. After discussing some qualifications, the paper concludes by drawing out 
implications for developing countries. 
 
Key elements of a prospective Doha agreement 
 
To what extent are trade and subsidy reform commitments likely to emerge from the 
Doha round? In addressing that question, it needs to be kept in mind from the outset that WTO 
trade negotiators are seeking agreement on reductions not to the applied tariffs and subsidies but 
rather to members’ legally bound import tariffs, agricultural export subsidies and bound 
commitments on domestic support to farmers. These bound rates are higher than applied rates in 
nearly all countries, but especially so in most developing countries. Hence if cuts to bound rates 
are sufficiently small, or the gap between bound and applied rates sufficiently large, no actual 
reform need take place from an agreed set of bound rate reductions.  
The Doha round was launched at the WTO Trade Ministerial meeting in Doha in late 
2001, but the following Ministerial meeting, in Cancun in September 2003, ended with acrimony 






abundantly clear that further progress would not be possible without a commitment by developed 
countries to significantly lower their agricultural subsidies (including importantly for cotton, 
despite its relatively minor role in developed country agriculture – see Sumner 2005). An intense 
period of consultations in July 2004 ended in the early hours of 1 August with a Decision on how 
the Doha Work Programme should proceed (WTO 2004). The so-called July Framework 
agreement that emerged from that Decision reiterates the importance of keeping development at 
the heart of the Doha agenda, and it particularly stresses agricultural reform as key to that. In its 
Annexes, the Decision provides guidance as to how a Doha agreement might be structured, with 
frameworks for establishing modalities for agriculture and for non-agricultural market access, as 
well as providing recommendations for trade in services. What emerged with respect to the three 
agricultural pillars has since been the subject of careful scrutiny because – as in the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture – the devil will be in the details. 
 
Agricultural market access 
Jean, Laborde and Martin (2005) examine the consequences of different tariff-cutting 
formulae, bearing in mind the tariff rate quotas (TRQs) described in the paper by de Gorter and 
Kliauga (2005), the prevalence of preferences for developing countries as described in Bouet 
Fontagné and Jean (2005), the need to accommodate “Sensitive” and “Special” farm products, 
and the Special and Differential Treatment outlined in the July Framework. For present purposes, 
tariff cutting is implemented at the 6-digit HS level of commodity disaggregation and involves a 
detailed comparison of each country's bound tariff, which is what negotiators focus on, with the 
applied MFN tariff on a given bilateral trade flow, which is what modelers need to deal with. 
The gap between bound and applied MFN tariffs is the so-called binding overhang, and it can 
blunt significantly the impact of any negotiated outcome – so much so that, in some Doha 
scenarios, countries are not required to change their applied tariffs at all. Once the detailed tariff 
analysis was conducted, the results were aggregated up to the GTAP and Linkage models’ 
regional and sectoral levels by the CEPII staff in Paris.
1 Note that the applied tariff cuts vary not 
only by sector, but also by trading partner – and may involve smaller cuts on imports from those 
developing countries currently enjoying non-reciprocal preferential access to richer countries’ 
markets (Hoekman and Ozden 2005).  
                                                 






Jean et al. (2005) evaluate the consequences for 2001 applied rates of different 
approaches to liberalization, and particularly different degrees of tops-down progressivity in the 
bound tariff cuts, as well as different degrees to which developing countries participate in 
reform. They look first at a proposal similar to the Harbinson progressive reduction formula (see 
WTO 2003b), with marginal tariff rate reductions of 35% for tariffs below 15 percent, 65% for 
tariffs above 90 percent and 60% for tariffs within the 15-90 percent bracket.
2 Developing 
country tariff cuts also follow the progressive-tax-style tiered formula, but for them Harbinson 
suggests four rather than three brackets, with inflexion points placed at tariff levels of 20, 60 and 
120 percent, so as to be consistent with Harbinson’s criterion of cutting by an average of 25%, 
30%, 40% and 45%, respectively, in those four brackets. 
That set of tariff cuts, it turns out, would lead to very little import liberalization, because 
bound tariffs in many countries exceed applied rates by such large margins. As a result, Jean et 
al. focus on a set of reforms that involve cuts in applied agricultural protection rates that are at 
least 10 percentage points greater, namely a 45%, 70% and 75% bound rate cutting rule for 
developed countries and a 35%, 40%, 50% and 60% cutting rule for developing countries. 
Consistent with the Framework, we assume least developed countries
3 make no reduction 
commitments in either of these two cases.  
Jean et al. then examine, and we model, the consequences of: 
•  allowing lesser tariff cuts for self-nominated “Sensitive” farm products assuming 
countries would take into account the importance of the commodity, the height of the 
existing tariff, and the gap between the tariff binding and the applied rate in deciding 
which products to grant such treatment, comparing situations in which countries are 
allowed to treat 2 percent of agricultural and food tariff lines as sensitive and so subject 
to just a 15 percent tariff cut;  
•  including “Special” agricultural products just for developing countries, by adding another 
2 percent of agricultural tariff lines as special and so subject to just a 15 percent tariff cut; 
and 
                                                 
2   This approach provides cuts in average tariffs -- without the discontinuities created by the proportional cuts 
involved in the Harbinson formula -- that are more or less comparable with those generated by Harbinson’s 
proportional reductions of 25%, 30% and 60%, because the larger cuts on higher tariffs apply only on the 
portion of the tariff above 15 or 90 percent, respectively. 
3   The so-called least developed countries (LDCs) group is a special classification of 50 developing countries 






•  adding a tariff cap of 200 percent, consistent with the suggestion in paragraph 30 of the 
Framework agreement that the role of a tariff cap be explored. 
 
Agricultural domestic support 
Reductions in domestic support have been a particular concern of developing countries. 
This reflects the fact that the developed countries are the major providers of such assistance, and 
many developing countries are concerned about the ability of their producers to compete with 
developed country farmers receiving large amounts of domestic support from their governments. 
While the marked asymmetry between industrial and developing countries is a concern, there is 
evidence, from Hertel and Keeney (2005) and from Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2004), that the 
benefits to developing countries from reductions in developed-country domestic support may be 
substantially smaller than the potential gains from reductions in market access barriers. None the 
less, disciplining such support is crucial not just to prevent policy reversals but also to ensure 
that when tariffs are lowered, import protection is not simply replaced by equally or more-
distorting domestic measures. 
The base from which reductions in domestic support will take place is the commitment 
on the total bound Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) agreed under Article 6 of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture. The July 2004 Framework agreement proposes tiered 
reductions in the total bound AMS, with larger reductions by Members with higher initial AMS 
levels. How much would actual distorting support need to be reduced under various degrees of 
reduction in each country’s total bound AMS? It turns out that extraordinarily large reductions in 
bound AMS are required before any reductions in actual support would occur – an outcome 
required by paragraph 9 of the Framework. If all countries with AMS notifications above 20 
percent of the value of production cut their bound protection by 75%, and all others by 60%, 
only four members would have to cut applied rates as of 2001: the US by 28%, Norway by 18%, 
the EU15 by 16%, and Australia by 10%. Since the EU and Australia have already made cuts 
beyond that amount, the only significant country that would be affected is the US. Therefore, the 
offer of an initial reduction of 20% in bound AMS (see Paragraph 7 of Annex A of the July 







Agricultural export subsidies 
Farm export subsidies are inconsistent with GATT rules, so for that reason alone they 
deserve to be eliminated. The empirical analysis summarized in Hertel and Keeney (2005) shows 
that they are now only a small part of agricultural support programs. That is true even when 
implicit subsidies in the form of food aid and export credits are included. A gradual phasing out 
over the next decade of both explicit and implicit forms of farm export subsidies should therefore 
be a politically feasible component of a comprehensive Doha agreement. Their elimination in 
isolation could harm a few food-importing and aid-dependent developing countries, but the poor 
net buyers of food in those countries can be assisted in far more efficient forms of aid than via 
these measures.  
 
Non-agricultural market access 
Negotiations in the area of non-agricultural tariffs have been lagging those on farm 
products. There has been a clear indication that developing countries wish to make lesser tariff 
cuts than developed countries and that least-developed countries expect to not have to make any 
cut commitments. A Doha round is unlikely to involve all non-agricultural bound tariffs being 
cut by more than 50 percent, so we assume there will be that degree of cut by developed 
countries and 33 percent by developing countries other than least-developed ones (from whom 
no cuts are being demanded). However, since that bound cut may lead to very little reduction in 
applied rates by developing countries, given their high tariff bindings relative to their applied 
tariffs, a more ambitious scenario involves them committing to more reform (in return for which 
they could seek reciprocity in the form of further cuts in developed countries’ agricultural and 
textiles tariffs). The most optimistic possibility is that developing (including least developed) 
countries agree to cut non-agricultural bound tariffs as much as developed countries (that is, by 
the 50 percent we assume). Especially if that were coupled by more-ambitious cuts in 
agricultural tariffs, developed countries could well respond with larger commitments themselves 
not only in trade but also with development aid.  
 
Services trade 
WTO members have been very slow in coming forward with Doha proposals to reform 






few meaningful commitments to genuinely open up their services sectors as part of the Doha 
round. For that reason, and because services trade is less-adequately represented in trade models 
than is goods trade, we have chosen to assume there will be no barrier reductions in this sector 
resulting from the Doha round – despite the fact that, as indicated in Hertel and Keeney (2005), 
gains from services reform could well be enormous, including for developing countries.   
 
The global LINKAGE model for assessing effects of future trade reform 
 
The model used for this analysis is the World Bank’s global dynamic computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model, known as LINKAGE (van der Mensbrugghe 2004). It is a relatively 
straightforward CGE model but with some characteristics that distinguish it from standard 
comparative static models such as the GTAP model (described in Hertel 1997). A key difference 
is that it is recursive dynamic, so while it starts with 2001 as its base year it can be solved 
annually through to 2015. The dynamics are driven by exogenous population and labor supply 
growth, savings-driven capital accumulation, and labor-augmenting technological progress (as 
assumed for the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects report in 2004). In any given year, 
factor stocks are fixed. Producers minimize costs subject to constant returns to scale production 
technology, consumers maximize utility, and all markets – including for labor – are cleared with 
flexible prices. There are three types of production structures. Crop sectors reflect the 
substitution possibility between extensive and intensive farming; livestock sectors reflect the 
substitution possibility between pasture and intensive feeding; and all other sectors reflect 
standard capital/labor substitution (with two types of labor, skilled and unskilled). There is a 
single representative household per modeled region, allocating income to consumption using the 
extended linear expenditure system. Trade is modeled using a nested Armington structure in 
which aggregate import demand is the outcome of allocating domestic absorption between 
domestic goods and aggregate imports, and then aggregate import demand is allocated across 
source countries to determine the bilateral trade flows. 
There are various sources of protection in the model. The most important involves 
bilateral import tariffs. There are also bilateral export subsidies. Domestically, there are subsidies 







Three closure rules are used. First, government fiscal balances are fixed in any given 
year.
4 The fiscal objective is met by changing the level of lump sum taxes on households. This 
implies that losses of tariff revenues are replaced by higher direct taxes on households. Second, 
the current account balance is fixed. Given that other external financial flows are fixed, this 
implies that ex ante changes to the trade balance are reflected in ex post changes to the real 
exchange rate. For example, if import tariffs are reduced, the propensity to import increases and 
additional imports are financed by increasing export revenues. The latter typically is achieved by 
a real exchange rate depreciation. Finally, investment is driven by savings. With fixed public and 
foreign saving, investment comes from changes in the savings behavior of households and from 
changes in the unit cost of investment. The latter can play an important role in a dynamic model 
if imported capital goods are taxed. Because the capital account is exogenous, rates of return 
across countries can differ over time and across simulations. The model only solves for relative 
prices, with the numéraire, or price anchor, being the export price index of manufactured exports 
from high-income countries. This price is fixed at unity in the base year and throughout the 
projection period to 2015. 
The newest version of the LINKAGE model, Version 6.0, is based on the latest release of 
the GTAP dataset, Release 6.05. Compared with Version 5 of the GTAP dataset, Version 6 has a 
2001 base year instead of 1997, updated national and trade data and, importantly, a new source 
for the protection data (see www.gtap.org for details). The new protection data come from a joint 
CEPII (Paris)/ITC (Geneva) project. The product of this joint effort, known as MAcMaps, is a 
HS6 tariff level detailed database on bilateral protection that integrates trade preferences, 
specific and compound tariffs and a partial evaluation of non-tariff barriers such as tariff rate 
quotas (TRQs).
5 The new GTAP database has lower tariffs than the previous database. This is 
because of the inclusion of bilateral trade preferences, as well as the major reforms between 1997 
and 2001 such as continued implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements, and China’s 
progress towards WTO accession which alone contributed to the ratio of global exports plus 
imports to GDP rising from 44 to 46 percent over those four years. 
                                                 
4  For the sake of simplicity they are fixed in US$ terms at their base year level, minimizing potential 
sustainability problems; but this implies they decrease over time as a percentage of GDP for expanding 
economies. 







The version of the LINKAGE model used for this study is comprised of a 27-region, 25-
sector aggregation of the GTAP data set. There is a heavy emphasis on agriculture and food, 
comprising 13 of the 25 sectors, and a focus on the largest commodity exporters and importers. 
 
The subsidies and import protection dataset 
 
The main source of protection resides in tariffs or border barriers, although some 
countries – particularly high-income countries – also have significant agricultural production and 
export subsidies. The average import tariff for agriculture and food in 2001 is 16.0 percent for 
high-income countries and 17.7 percent for developing countries, while for manufactures other 
than textiles and clothing it is 8.3 percent for developing countries and just 1.3 percent for high-
income countries. The averages of course obscure large variations across countries and 
commodities. For example, if high-income countries’ tariffs on temperate farm products are at a 
near-prohibitive 100 percent, but zero on tropical products such as coffee, the import-weighted 
average agricultural tariff could be quite low. Even at a relatively aggregated level, the variations 
can be quite sharp. For example, India has an average tariff in agriculture and food of 82 percent 
on imports from East Asia, but only 20 percent on imports from Sub-Saharan Africa. Also, high-
income countries’ agricultural tariffs on goods from low-income countries are lower than on 
imports from the high- and middle-income countries, while imports of textiles and clothing from 
low-income countries face a higher average tariff than imports from middle- or high-income 
countries.  
 
Estimates of welfare impact of current protection policies 
 
The LINKAGE model provides a baseline projection of the world economy first to 2005 
and then to 2015 assuming no other policy changes. Deviations from that baseline in 2015, due 
to phased partial or total liberalization from 2005, are then examined.  
One benchmark against which to measure the prospective benefits of Doha is that which 
would come from freeing merchandise trade completely over the 2005-2010 period. That leads to 
global gains by 2015 of $287 billion per year, according to the LINKAGE model. Another 






to end-2004, due to the final stages of Uruguay Round implementation including the phase-out 
of the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), the accession of China and Taiwan to the WTO, and the 
eastern enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 25 members.
6 The impacts of those 
reforms on import tariffs are non-trivial. Had those three reforms not been implemented, the 
dynamic gains in 2015 from freeing global merchandise trade would have been $341 billion 
instead of $287 billion, or an extra $54 billion per year. Nearly half of that difference is due to 
the removal of MFA quotas and hence should be considered part of the Uruguay Round’s legacy 
– assuming safeguards by high-income countries or export restraints by China do not replace 
textile and clothing quotas from 2005.
 7 
Table 1 reports the distribution across regions of the standard economic welfare or real 
income (equivalent variation) effects of removing all merchandise trade barriers and agricultural 
subsidies globally. Of the $287 billion gain in income that reform would generate for the global 
economy per year by 2015, two-thirds would accrue to the high-income countries. However, as a 
share of national income, developing countries (as self-defined by WTO members) would do 
twice as well, with an average increase of 1.2 percent compared with 0.6 percent for high-income 
countries. The results vary widely across developing countries, ranging from little impact in the 
case of Bangladesh and Mexico to 4 or 5 percent increases in parts of East Asia. The second 
column of numbers in Table 1 shows the amount of that welfare gain due to changes in the 
international terms of trade for each country. For developing countries as a group the terms of 
trade effect is negative, reducing somewhat the gains from improved efficiency of domestic 
resource use (especially in China and India). That effect would dissipate over time, however, as 
developing countries diversify their exports in the course of their industrialization.  
                                                 
6   These are the key internationally agreed and bound policy changes. We do not include unilateral and unbound 
policy changes such as recent reforms in EU and US farm programs. 
7   To get a sense of how important preferences are do developing country and global welfare, we re-ran the model 
for 2001, prior to the pre-simulation experiment, without those preferences in place. The estimated global 
welfare gains from reform are then $382 billion instead of $341 billion, and the developing country gains are 
$150 billion instead of $113 billion. That is, the inclusion of preferences in the database reduces the estimated 
gains to global, developing country and high-income country welfare by 11, 25 and 2 percent, respectively. 
Much of the difference is attributable to Sub-Saharan Africa, whose reduction is almost 50 percent. The 25 (and 
especially 50) percent numbers overstate the difference for developing countries, however, for two reasons. One 
is that we assume there are no rules of origin or other impediments to developing countries fully utilizing their 
preferences. The second is that we also assume importers in the preference-providing rich countries do not use 
their power to gain a disproportionate share of the rent from that preferential access. In practice neither of these 






There are several ways to decompose the real income gains from full global trade reform 
so as to better understand the sources of the gains for each region. One way is to assess the 
impacts of developing country liberalization versus industrial country liberalization in different 
economic sectors; another is to decompose by policy instrument. The latter gives results very 
similar to those from the GTAP model reported in Hertel and Keeney (2005), who estimate that 
market access barriers explain 93 percent of the welfare effects of agricultural policies, with 
domestic support and export subsidy removal contributing only 5 and 2 percentage points, 
respectively.
8   
Our results when decomposed by sector are provided in Table 2. They suggest global 
liberalization of agriculture and food contributes 63 percent of the total global gains (similar to 
Hertel and Keeney’s 66 per cent). This is consistent with the high tariffs in agriculture and food 
(17 percent global average) versus other sectors, but is nonetheless remarkable given the low 
shares of agriculture in global GDP (4 percent) and global merchandise trade (9 percent). Seven-
tenths of those gains are accounted for by the farm policies of high-income countries, and those 
policies also account for the majority of the overall gains to high-income countries. For 
developing countries, as much of their gain from farm reform would come from South-South 
agricultural liberalization as from developing countries getting unrestricted access to high-
income country markets. That is almost equally true in manufacturing in aggregate, despite the 
big gains from textiles and clothing reform ($14 billion from market access in high-income 
countries compared with $9 billion due to South-South textiles trade growth). In other words, 
reform by developing countries is equally as important in terms of economic welfare gains to the 
South as reform by high-income countries. It is clear that reforming agricultural policies in both 
sets of countries, not just in high-income countries, is crucial for developing countries. Notice 
also that developing country gains from high-income country reform are only half as large from 
textiles as from agricultural policies.  
Politicians have an eye also on what happens to their country’s volume of output and 
exports in sectors whose protection is cut, and on earnings of constituents. Contrary to much 
rhetoric from protectionist groups, the full liberalization results suggest little change in the high-
income countries’ shares of global output and exports of processed food, beverages and tobacco, 
                                                 
8   Hoekman, Ng and Olarreago (2004) reach a similar conclusion from estimating the effects of halving each of 






and of other manufactures. Only for primary agriculture are the changes noticeable: the export 
share falls by more than one-quarter, from 53 to 38 percent (including intra-EU trade) – but the 
output share falls by only one-sixth, from 30 to 25 percent. In absolute terms, agricultural and 
food output in high-income countries would decline but only by 0.1 percent per year over the 
projection period to 2015 following a move to free trade in all merchandise, instead of rising by 
1.6 percent per year. Agricultural and food exports are enhanced much more than output in each 
region, so the global share of agricultural and food production exported rises, from 9.5 to 13.2 
percent (or from 6.6 to 11.6 percent when intra-EU trade is excluded). Also of interest is what 
happens to exports net of imports by sector. The expected continued decline in net imports of 
food and agricultural products by middle-income countries as a group in 2015 would be 
dramatically reversed, while for low-income countries its net exports of those goods would grow 
only a little faster – but its net exports of textiles and clothing would increase dramatically. Net 
exports of other manufactures by developing countries, by contrast, would fall to nearly zero 
(Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugge 2005a, Tables 12.5, A12.6 and A12.7). 
What impact would the removal of cotton trade distortions and subsidies (which raise 
producer prices by more than 50 percent in the US and even more in the EU) have in this context 
of freeing all merchandise trade and agricultural subsidies? The price of cotton in international 
markets is estimated to be considerably higher in 2015, including for US exports because its 
subsidies would no longer depress that price. However, the volume of US cotton exports shrinks 
when those subsidies are removed, raising the price for other countries’ exports. The price rise 
would not apply equally to all cotton exporters however, because of product differentiation as 
captured in the Armington elasticities. For Brazil and Australia, the rise is 8 percent, while for 
Sub-Saharan Africa it averages less than 2 percent (relative to the numéraire, which is the 
average price of exports of manufactures from high-income countries). However, cotton output 
and exports from Sub-Saharan Africa would be 44 and 73 percent larger, respectively, under this 
full liberalization scenario, with the value of both the output and export rises being greater than 
for any other region including Latin America. The share of all developing countries in global 
cotton exports would be 85 percent instead of 56 percent in 2015, vindicating their efforts to 
ensure cotton receives specific attention in the Doha negotiations (see Sumner 2005 and Baffes 






The above results are for full trade liberalization. Smaller changes can be expected to 
result from partial reforms of the sort being negotiated currently under the Doha Development 
Agenda. It is to those that attention now turns. 
 
Prospective Doha scenarios: estimating their consequences 
 
The scenarios 
What will the Doha package ultimately contain? So as to focus on the agricultural 
component in particular, we assume no reform in services. We also assume agricultural export 
subsidies are eliminated by 2015, and that domestic support for agriculture is cut in just four 
economies: by an average of 28 percent for the U.S., 18 percent for Norway, 16 percent for the 
EU and 10 percent for Australia (relative to 2001 levels, as explained above). More difficult to 
determine are the likely nature and extent of reductions in market access barriers, so a number of 
scenarios are considered initially for agricultural and food products in isolation of non-
agricultural tariff cuts, before incorporating also some non-agricultural market access.
9 
Throughout this section, the WTO usage of the term ‘developing countries’ applies when 
allocating Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) in the form of lesser commitments to 
reform, which means Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan are all able to enjoy SDT 
despite their high-income status. 
The experiments begin for Scenario 1 with a progressive or tiered reduction formula with 
marginal agricultural tariff rate reductions of 45%, 70% and 75% within each of the three bands 
defined by the Harbinson (WTO 2003b) inflection points of tariff rates of 15 and 90 percent for 
developed countries (that is, for low agricultural tariffs the marginal rate of reduction is 45%, for 
medium-level tariffs it is 70%, and for the highest tariffs it is 75%), and for developing countries 
the reductions are 35%, 40%, 50% and 60% within each of their four bands (except least 
developed countries are not required to undertake any reduction commitments). Even these large 
cuts to bound tariffs (which are greater than those proposed in the Harbinson draft because we 
found its cuts were too light to have much impact) would lead to the average applied tariffs on 
                                                 
9   As suggested in the Girard Text (see WTO 2003a), we assume that in the absence of a bound tariff on a good it 






agricultural and food products in 2015 being only one-third lower globally (10.0 instead of 15.2 
percent) and 12.5 instead of 14.2 percent for developing countries.  
Scenario 2 examines the consequences of including “Sensitive” farm products as allowed 
for in the July Framework, with developed countries allowed to treat 2% of their HS6 
agricultural tariff lines as sensitive and thereby subject to just a 15 percent tariff cut (as a 
substitute for the TRQ expansion mentioned in the Framework Agreement), and double those 
proportions of products for both developing and least developed countries, in part to incorporate 
also their demand for “Special” products treatment.
10 This would lead to the average agricultural 
tariff falling only to 13.5 percent in both high-income and developing countries.  
Scenario 3 considers the effects of adding to Scenario 2 a tariff cap of 200% such that 
any product with a bound tariff in excess of that limit will be subjected to a reduction down to 
that cap rate, which leads to average cuts in agricultural tariffs of 18 percent for both developed 
and developing countries. This would lead to the average agricultural tariff falling in 2015 
considerably more for high-income countries (to 11.5 percent) and but only very slightly more 
(to 13.3 percent) for developing countries. 
Scenario 4 adds to Scenario 1 the cuts in non-agricultural tariff bindings of 50 percent in 
developed countries, 33 percent in developing countries, and zero in least-developed countries. 
That lowers the average tariff on all merchandise from 2.9 percent in the baseline to 1.6 percent 
for high-income countries and from 8.4 to 7.5 percent for developing countries.  
Finally, Scenario 5 makes developing (including least-developed) countries full 
participants in the round, undertaking the same reductions in bound (but not necessarily applied) 
tariffs as the developed countries in Scenario 4. That lowers the average tariff on all merchandise 
for developing countries from 8.4 to 6.8 instead of 7.5 percent, a cut of almost one-fifth in this 
case instead of just one-ninth as in Scenario 4. 
 
Estimated welfare and trade effects of those scenarios as of 2015 
The welfare consequences of implementing these various reforms over the 2005-2010 
period and allowing the global economy to adjust to 2015 are summarized in Table 3(a) in dollar 
terms and in Table 3(b) as percentage changes in real income in 2015.  
                                                 
10   As described in Jean, Laborde and Martin (2005), “Sensitive” farm products are chosen for each country by 
taking into account the importance of the product, the height of its existing tariff, and the gap between its bound 






Column 1 of Table 3(a) suggests that agricultural liberalization using the harmonizing 
formula (Scenario 1) would generate a global gain of $75 billion even without the inclusion of 
non-agricultural tariff reform. But almost all those benefits accrue to the reforming high-income 
countries (with whom we include protective Korea and Taiwan as well as Hong Kong and 
Singapore in this and subsequent tables) such that developing countries would gain only $9 
billion because their tariff binding overhang is so great as to lead to almost no cuts in their 
applied tariffs. Were countries allowed to have lesser cuts for even just 2 percent of their farm 
products they declare to be “Sensitive” (and another 2 percent in developing countries for their 
“Special” farm products), those global gains would shrink to just $18 billion and developing 
countries as a group would be worse off (Scenario 2). If such exceptions are to be made, it would 
be important to exploit the opportunity – provided for in the July 2004 Framework – to put a cap 
on bound tariffs. Scenario 3 shows that even if the cap was as high as 200%, that would restore 
at least half of the welfare gain foregone by allowing such exceptional treatment for “Sensitive” 
and “Special” farm products. 
The final two scenarios add non-agricultural tariff cuts to the agricultural reforms in the 
preceding scenarios. In scenario 4, lesser cuts are provided for developing countries’ non-
agricultural tariffs, as is the case for all the preceding agricultural cut scenarios. Even so, the gain 
to developing countries doubles by adding these non-farm reforms, relative to Scenario 1 where 
only agriculture is cut, contributing one-third of the extra boost to global welfare ($7.1 billion 
out of the $21.6 billion difference between the global gains from Scenarios 1 and 4). In Scenario 
5, the developing (including least-developed) countries fully engage in the reform process, 
foregoing the lesser cuts provided for in Scenarios 1 to 4. That boosts theirs and global welfare 
substantially, because their cuts in bound tariffs lead to considerably larger cuts in applied tariffs. 
Nonetheless, the global average merchandise tariff hardly changes if there were just agricultural 
reform, whereas it falls by almost one-third or 1.5 percentage points when manufacturing is 
included in the reform package.   
Retaining lesser cuts for developing countries as in Scenario 4 would yield a global gain 
of $96 billion from Doha merchandise liberalization, which is a sizable one-third of what is on 
the table (the potential welfare gain from full liberalization of $287 billion, reported in Table 1). 
But for developing countries the gain would be only $16 billion, which is less than one-fifth of 






option of reforming less than developed countries, that raises their gain by 42 percent, or an extra 
$7 billion. Much of those gains go to the largest developing economies, but note that, in 
percentage terms, Sub-Saharan Africa also gains substantially if it liberalizes more – contrary to 
the presumptions of many commentators. By contrast, in Scenario 4 the ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ countries simply are not liberalizing enough to get sufficient efficiency gains to offset the 
terms of trade losses suffered either as net food importers, or as recipients of tariff preferences 
that have eroded with the decline in high-income countries’ MFN tariffs, or because of the 
combined export growth from reforming economies with similar export compositions.
11  
How big would be the consequences of partial reform for farm output and employment 
growth over the Doha implementation period post-2004? If there was completely free trade, farm 
output would decline (instead of growing slightly) in just the EU and Japan while growing 
slower in a few other highly protective countries – but, for most countries/regions, farming 
activities would expand. The Doha Scenario 4 would involve much less reform than a move to 
free trade, and hence a much slower loss of farm output for the EU and Japan – but also less 
output growth than under free trade for the vast majority of countries where farm output would 
be greater. For most of the protective economies, Doha Scenario 4 would simply slow the growth 
of farm output a little over the coming decade. The farm employment picture is somewhat 
different. Typically, economic growth leads to declines in not only the relative importance of 
agriculture but also in absolute numbers employed in farming once a country reaches middle-
income status. Thus it is not surprising that numerous middle- and high-income countries are 
projected to lose farm jobs over the next decade in our baseline scenario. For the most protected 
farm sectors, that rate of farm employment decline would more than double if the world were to 
move to completely free trade; but it would increase only slightly under Doha Scenario 4. For 
most developing economies, though, farm employment would grow a little faster under that 
Doha scenario as compared with the baseline, allowing them to absorb more workers on their 
farms (Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugge 2005a, Table 12.17).
12  
How does this get reflected in agricultural net income (value added by the farming 
sector)? Table 4 shows, not surprisingly, that agricultural value added would fall in those regions 
                                                 
11    For more details of our results for Sub-Saharan Africa, see Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 
(2005c). 
12   This finding of only small intersectoral labor movements in response to partial trade reform is consistent with 






with the highest agricultural protection (Europe, Northeast Asia and to a lesser extent the US). 
However, in the Doha reform scenario none of the developing countries/regions shown in Table 
4 would suffer a decline in agricultural net income, despite the lowering of their own agricultural 
tariffs. The reason for their farmers faring better than protected rich-country farmers – even 
though the average agricultural tariff in developing countries is nearly as high as that in high-
income countries (14.2 percent compared with 15.9 percent in the baseline) – is because a much 
larger proportion of developing country agriculture is internationally competitive and so does not 
have to be protected from imports. This result has clear implications for poverty alleviation, 
given that perhaps as many as 70 percent of the world’s poor are in farm households in 
developing countries. 
The trade consequences of Doha Scenario 4 are summarized in Table 5. The first column 
shows that by 2015, annual developing country exports would be greater by $41 billion for 
agricultural products, $25 billion for textiles and clothing, and $12 billion for other 
manufactures. Their total increase of $78 billion is somewhat smaller than that for high-income 
countries ($135 billion), but that difference is less when expressed in percentage terms (a 2.6 
percent increase for developing countries, compared with 3.1 percent for high-income countries). 
This takes global merchandise trade one-fifth the way to where it would be if the move was to 
completely free trade in merchandise.
13  
Of more interest to trade negotiators are the changes in bilateral trades: they want to see 
the extent to which such an exchange of market access would be ‘balanced’. Not surprisingly, 
developing countries expand their exports of agricultural and textile products to high-income 
countries more than they expand their imports of those products from high-income countries. But 
the opposite is true of other manufactures, so that for merchandise trade in total the difference is 
not great: in f.o.b. terms developing countries in 2015 would sell $62 billion more to high-
income countries and would buy $55 billion in return under Doha Scenario 4 (see columns 2 and 
3 of Table 5). This small gap might be tolerated by high-income countries as a concession to 
development, but otherwise it could be narrowed by developing countries reforming more in 
                                                 
13   It also raises the share of agricultural and food production that is exported globally, from 9.5 to 10.0 percent, 
which is one-seventh of the way towards its share of 13.2 percent under the free trade scenario. Even in the 
protected countries this ratio rises a little or, in the case of Europe, falls only very slightly. This is because of 
farm resources moving from currently protected import-competing sub-sectors to more-competitive farming 











Results such as those presented above are always dependent on the assumptions, data and 
parameters underlying them and so are subject to numerous qualifications. One that is 
particularly important to highlight has to do with the way preferences are treated in the Version 6 
GTAP database. In previous versions of that database, only key reciprocal preferences were 
included (notably between members within the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN and Australia-New 
Zealand regional integration arrangements), whereas the new Version 6 includes non-reciprocal 
tariff preferences provided by developed countries for their imports from developing countries 
under numerous arrangements such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the EU’s 
provisions for former colonies under the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) program and more 
recently for Least Developed Countries under the Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement, and 
likewise the US’s Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI). We have assumed that there are no rules of origin (ROOs) or other compliance 
requirements which discourage developing countries from taking full advantage of those 
preferences (even though we know such requirements often lead to underutilization); and we 
have assumed perfect competition between traders in the two sets of countries, which determines 
how rents from those preferences are shared between the exporting and importing countries 
(even though we know the developed country importers often have more market power than the 
developing country exporters of standard commodities such that the latter receives a smaller 
share of the rents than our analysis generates).
14 We therefore overstate the extent of preference 
erosion that would occur for especially least-developed countries, and so understate their gains 
from multilateral trade reform. If instead those non-reciprocal preferences were excluded from 
the database, we would overestimate the preference-receiving countries’ gains from developed 
                                                 
14   Evidence that the preference margin is often eroded by complex rules of origin, and that the rent is shared 
between importing and exporting countries with the latter getting less the more trade is concentrated on standard 
commodities, can be found in Olarreaga and Ozden (2005) and Ozden and Sharma (2004). A recent partial 
equilibrium study found that in practice export revenue losses from preference erosion are likely to be limited to 
a small subset of countries, primarily small island economies dependent on exports of sugar, bananas and, to a 






country trade reform. So until we have a better way to incorporate these real-world aspects of 
preference schemes, the reader should simply be aware that the welfare gains would be higher 
(or losses less) for least-developed countries than indicated above.
15  
Imports of agricultural products subject to tariff rate quotas (TRQs) are handled less than 
perfectly in the World Bank’s LINKAGE model and the GTAP database, in two respects. First, in 
the Version 6 GTAP database the treatment of tariffs applied on TRQ commodities depends on 
the extent to which the quota is filled: if the quota is less than 90 percent filled, the in-quota tariff 
is assumed to apply on these commodities; if the quota is between 90 and 99 percent filled, the 
effective tariff is assumed to be the average of the in-quota and out-of-quota tariffs; and if the 
quota is more than 99 percent filled, then the out-of-quota tariff is applied. Second, where TRQs 
are non-binding and hence the in-quota tariff is used, and preferences are provided to developing 
countries, such a preference may well be illusory. If imports increased, for example, the out-of-
quota tariff may kick in. Furthermore, de Gorter and Kliauga (2005) identify cases where the 
out-of-quota tariff has been applied at the margin even though the quota was not filled. This 
provides an additional reason to expect that we have overstated the costs of preference erosion. 
  Another important caveat worth stressing is that the above results do not incorporate the 
fact that trade reform typically boosts factor productivity. If instead we were to assume 
productivity is positively related to changes in sectoral openness, as specified in World Bank 
(2002) and Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005b, Table 17.3), then the estimated 
global gains from freeing merchandise trade increase by one-third.
16 More importantly, they 
increase by two-thirds for developing countries, because the initial protection rates are so much 
higher there. For this reason even more than because of our treatment of preferences, the welfare 
gains from the reforms presented in this paper should be taken as very much lower-bound 
estimates.
17 
                                                 
15   The extent of overstatement would not be large though, since the difference in the low-income countries’ 
estimated benefits even from full liberalization is only $2 billion p.a. when non-reciprocal preferences are 
excluded instead of included in the LINKAGE model’s database, or $8 billion when middle-income countries are 
also included (van der Mensbrugghe 2005). A further complication is that the ACP non-reciprocal preference 
scheme is scheduled to be replaced from 2008 with reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
between regional groupings of those countries and the EU.   
16   The trade-related productivity increase is limited to the manufacturing sectors in this simulation, unlike World 
Bank (2002) where agricultural productivity was also allowed to respond to changes in openness. 
17   Other reasons for the above results to be considered lower-bound estimates are that we assume constant returns 






  The above analysis does not include costs of adjustment to reform, but these are typically 
far less than commonly assumed. Indeed, the structural changes that take place over time in the 
normal course of economic growth are shown above to be typically very much larger than the 
small changes that would accompany gradual and partial trade liberalization. Furthermore, 
adjustment assistance scheme (financed by foreign aid in the case of low-income countries) are a 
way to help fund adjustment to tariff and subsidy cuts – and they are just one-off payments, 
whereas the benefits of reform continue into the future. 
 
Implications for developing countries  
 
  The good news in this paper is that there is a great deal to be gained from liberalizing 
merchandise – and especially agricultural – trade under Doha, with a disproportionately high 
share of that potential gain available for developing countries (relative to their share of the global 
economy). Moreover, it is the poorest people in developing countries that appear to be most 
likely to gain from global trade liberalization, namely farmers and unskilled laborers in 
developing countries. To realize that potential gain, it is in agriculture that by far the greatest cuts 
in bound tariffs and subsidies are required. However, the political sensitivity of farm support 
programs, coupled with the complexities of the measures introduced in the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture and of the modalities set out in the Doha Framework Agreement of 
July 2004, ensure the devil will be in the details of the final Doha agreement. It is for that reason 
that ex ante empirical analysis of the sort provided above is a prerequisite for countries engaged 
in the Doha round of negotiations. 
Among the numerous policy implications that can be drawn from our analysis, several are 
worth highlighting. First, with global gains of the order of $95-120 billion per year at stake from 
implementing the July Framework Agreement, even if no reforms are forthcoming in services, 
and even if the counterfactual would be the status quo rather than protectionist backsliding, the 
political will needs to be found to bring the round to a successful conclusion, and the sooner the 
better. Multilateral cuts in tariff bindings are helpful also because they can lock in previous 
unilateral trade liberalizations that otherwise would remain unbound and hence vulnerable to 






previously agreed preferential trade agreements and thereby reduce the risk of trade diversion 
from those bilateral or regional arrangements. 
  Second, agricultural reforms need to be significant if the Doha agreement is to be pro-
development and pro-poor. Outlawing agricultural export subsidies is the obvious first step. That 
will bring agriculture into line with the basic GATT rule against such measures, and in the 
process help to limit the extent to which governments encourage agricultural production by other 
means (since it would remove one option for, and hence raise the cost of, surplus disposal). 
Concurrently, domestic support bindings must be cut very substantially to reduce binding 
overhang. In so doing, the highest-subsidizing countries need to reduce their support, not just for 
the sake of their own economies but also to encourage developing countries to reciprocate by 
opening their markets as a quid pro quo. An initial installment of a 20 percent cut in domestic 
support is nothing more than a start towards getting rid of that overhang. Even more importantly, 
agricultural tariff bindings must be cut hugely so that some genuine market opening can occur. 
Allowing lesser cuts for even just a few “Sensitive” and “Special” farm products is undesirable 
as it would reduce hugely the gains from reform, given the tariff peaks currently in place. If it 
turns out to be politically impossible not to designate some products as “Sensitive” and 
“Special”, it would be crucial to impose a cap such that any product with a bound tariff in excess 
of, say, 100 percent had to reduce it to that cap rate.  
  Third, expanding non-agricultural market access at the same time as reforming 
agriculture is essential for a balanced exchange of “concessions” -- and it needs to be more than 
just textiles and clothing (which also benefit developing countries disproportionately) even 
though they are the other highly distorted sector. The additional benefits of other merchandise 
and services being included are that the trade expansion could be many times greater for both 
rich and poor countries, and the welfare gains are substantially larger for developing countries. 
  Fourth, South-South “concessions” also are needed, especially for developing countries 
as that is where half their potential benefits lie. That means reconsidering the extent to which 
developing countries liberalize. Since developing countries are trading so much more with each 
other now than in the 1980s, they are the major beneficiaries of reforms within their own regions. 
Even least developed countries should consider reducing their tariff binding overhang at least, 
since doing that in the context of the Doha round gives them more scope to demand 






deterioration) from richer countries than if they hang on to the opportunity, provided in the July 
Framework, not to engage in reform.   
What emerges from our analysis is that developing countries would not have to reform 
very much under Doha, because of the large gaps between their tariff bindings and applied rates. 
But to realize more of their potential gains from trade, they would need to commit to additional 
trade (and complementary domestic) reforms, and to invest more in trade facilitation. High-
income countries could encourage them to do so not only by being willing to open up their own 
markets more to developing country exports but also by providing more targeted aid. To that 
end, a new proposal has been put forward to reward developing country commitments to greater 
trade reform with an expansion of trade-facilitating aid, to be provided by a major expansion of 
the current Integrated Framework which is operated by a consortium of international agencies for 
least developed countries (Hoekman and Prowse 2005). This may well provide an attractive path 
for developing countries seeking to trade their way out of poverty. As well, it is potentially a far 
more efficient way for developed countries to assist people in low-income countries than the 
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Table 1: Impacts on real income from full liberalization of global merchandise trade, by 
country/region, 2015 






due just to 
change in terms 
of trade 
($billion) 




      
Australia and New Zealand  6.1  3.5  1.0 
EU 25 plus EFTA  65.2  0.5  0.6 
United States  16.2  10.7  0.1 
Canada  3.8  -0.3  0.4 
Japan  54.6  7.5  1.1 
Korea and Taiwan  44.6  0.4  3.5 
Hong Kong and Singapore  11.2  7.9  2.6 
Argentina  4.9 1.2  1.2 
Bangladesh  0.1 -1.1  0.2 
Brazil  9.9 4.6  1.5 
China  5.6 -8.3  0.2 
India  3.4 -9.4  0.4 
Indonesia  1.9 0.2  0.7 
Thailand  7.7 0.7  3.8 
Vietnam  3.0 -0.2  5.2 
Russia  2.7 -2.7  0.6 
Mexico  3.6 -3.6  0.4 
South Africa  1.3 0.0  0.9 
Turkey  3.3 0.2  1.3 
Rest of South Asia  1.0  -0.8  0.5 
Rest of East Asia  5.3  -0.9  1.9 
Rest of LAC  10.3  0.0  1.2 
Rest of ECA  1.0  -1.6  0.3 
Middle East and North Africa  14.0  -6.4  1.2 
Selected SSA countries
a  1.0  0.5  1.5 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  2.5  -2.3  1.1 
Rest of the World  3.4  0.1  1.5 
High-income countries  201.6 30.3  0.6 
WTO Developing countries  141.5 -21.4  1.2 
Developing countries (World Bank definition)  85.7 -29.7  0.8 
     Middle-income countries  69.5 -16.7  0.8 
     Low-income countries  16.2 -12.9  0.8 
     East Asia and Pacific  23.5  -8.5  0.7 
     South Asia  4.5  -11.2  0.4 
     Europe and Central Asia  7.0  -4.0  0.7 
     Middle East and North Africa  14.0  -6.4  1.2 
     Sub-Saharan Africa  4.8  -1.8  1.1 
     Latin America and the Caribbean  28.7  2.2  1.0 
World total  287.3  0.6  0.7 
a The selected Sub-Saharan African countries (for which national modules are available in the 
LINKAGE Model) include Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe.   






Table 2: Regional and sectoral source of gains from full liberalization of global 
merchandise trade, developing and high-income countries, 2015 
(Change in real income in 2015 relative to baseline scenario) 
 
  Gains by region in $billion  Percent of regional gain 










        
Developing countries liberalize:        
Agriculture and food  28 19 47 33  9 17 
Textiles and clothing  9 14 23 10  7  8 
Other merchandise  6 52 58  7 26 20 
All sectors  43 85  128 50 42 45 
        
High-income countries liberalize:        
Agriculture and food  26  109  135 30 54 47 
Textiles and clothing  13 2  15  15 1 5 
Other merchandise  4 5 9 5 2 3 
All sectors  43  116  159 50 57 55 
        
All countries liberalize:        
Agriculture and food  54  128  182 63 64 63 
Textiles and clothing  22 16 38 25  8 14 
Other merchandise  10 57 67 12 28 23 
All sectors  86 201 287 100 100 100 
 
 
a Small interaction effects are distributed proportionately and numbers are rounded to sum to 100 
percent 
 






Table 3: Change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios, 2015 
(a) Dollar change (in 2001 $billion compared to baseline scenario) 
 
  Scen. 1 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 Scen. 4 Scen. 5 
Australia & New Zealand  2.0  1.1  1.2  2.4  2.8 
EU 25 plus EFTA  29.5  10.7  10.9  31.4  35.7 
United States  3.0  2.3  2.1  4.9  6.6 
Canada  1.4  0.5  0.4  0.9  1.0 
Japan  18.9  1.8  12.9  23.7  25.4 
Korea and Taiwan  10.9  1.7  15.9  15.0  22.6 
Hong Kong and Singapore  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  1.5  2.2 
Argentina  1.3 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.6 
Bangladesh  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
Brazil  3.3 1.1 1.1 3.6 3.9 
China  -0.5 -1.5 -1.1  1.7  1.6 
India  0.2 0.2 0.2 2.2 3.5 
Indonesia  0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 1.2 
Thailand  0.9 0.6 0.8 2.0 2.7 
Vietnam  -0.1  0.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 
Russia  -0.3 -0.7 -0.7  0.8  1.5 
Mexico  -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.2 
South  Africa  0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 
Turkey  0.6 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.4 
Rest of South Asia  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.7 
Rest of East Asia  0.1  0.0  1.0  0.3  0.6 
Rest of LAC  3.7  0.5  0.4  3.9  4.0 
Rest of ECA  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -0.6  -0.7 
Middle East & N. Africa  -0.8  -1.2  -1.2  -0.6  0.1 
Selected SSA countries  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.0  -0.3  -0.3  -0.1  0.3 
Rest of the World  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.6 
High-income  countries  65.6 18.1 43.2 79.9 96.4 
WTO  Dev.  countries  19.7  1.2 16.8 32.6 47.7 
Developing countries (WB)  9.0 -0.4  1.1 16.1 22.9 
   Middle-income countries  8.0  -0.5  1.0  12.5  17.1 
      Low-income  countries  1.0 0.1 0.0 3.6 5.9 
   East Asia and Pacific  0.5  -0.8  0.6  4.5  5.5 
   South Asia  0.4  0.3  0.4  2.5  4.2 
   Europe and Central Asia  0.1  -0.9  -0.9  0.8  2.1 
   Middle East & N. Africa  -0.8  -1.2  -1.2  -0.6  0.1 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  0.3  0.0  -0.1  0.4  1.2 
   Lat. America & the Carib.  8.1  2.3  2.1  7.9  9.2 








Table 3: Change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios, 2015 (continued) 
(b) Percentage change compared with baseline 
 
  Scen. 1 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 Scen. 4 Scen. 5 
Australia & New Zealand  0.35  0.20  0.20  0.42  0.48 
EU 25 plus EFTA  0.29  0.11  0.11  0.31  0.36 
United States  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.05 
Canada  0.15  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.11 
Japan  0.38  0.04  0.26  0.48  0.51 
Korea and Taiwan  0.86  0.13  1.26  1.19  1.79 
Hong Kong and Singapore  -0.02  -0.03  -0.04  0.35  0.52 
Argentina  0.32 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.39 
Bangladesh  -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.09 
Brazil  0.50 0.16 0.17 0.55 0.59 
China  -0.02 -0.06 -0.04  0.07  0.06 
India  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.25 0.40 
Indonesia  0.05 0.07 0.01 0.37 0.44 
Thailand  0.43 0.29 0.38 0.99 1.33 
Vietnam  -0.20 -0.09 -0.16 -0.83 -0.97 
Russia  -0.06 -0.16 -0.15  0.16  0.31 
Mexico  -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 
South  Africa  0.06 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.49 
Turkey  0.25 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.55 
Rest of South Asia  0.13  0.05  0.14  0.17  0.39 
Rest of East Asia  0.02  0.01  0.36  0.09  0.22 
Rest of LAC  0.44  0.06  0.04  0.46  0.47 
Rest of ECA  -0.06  -0.09  -0.08  -0.22  -0.26 
Middle East & N. Africa  -0.07  -0.10  -0.10  -0.05  0.01 
Selected SSA countries  0.21  -0.02  -0.05  0.19  0.26 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.02  -0.13  -0.14  -0.02  0.13 
Rest of the World  0.19  0.00  0.02  0.26  0.28 
High-income  countries  0.20 0.06 0.13 0.25 0.30 
WTO  Dev.  Countries  0.17 0.01 0.14 0.27 0.40 
Developing countries (WB)  0.09 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.22 
   Middle-income countries  0.10  -0.01  0.01  0.15  0.21 
      Low-income  countries  0.05 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.30 
   East Asia and Pacific  0.01  -0.02  0.02  0.13  0.16 
   South Asia  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.21  0.36 
   Europe and Central Asia  0.01  -0.09  -0.09  0.08  0.21 
   Middle East & N. Africa  -0.07  -0.10  -0.10  -0.05  0.01 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  0.06  -0.01  -0.02  0.10  0.27 
   Lat. America & the Carib.  0.29  0.08  0.08  0.29  0.33 
World  total  0.18 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.28 
 







Table 4: Impact of reform scenarios on agricultural value added, 2015 
 
(changes in value added relative to baseline, 2001 dollars and percent) 
 












Australia and New Zealand  6.4  2.4  25.6  9.8 
EU 25 plus EFTA  -39.1  -20.4  -26.4  -13.8 
United States  -18.2  -6.3  -15.0  -5.2 
Canada  3.4  0.9  23.3  5.8 
Japan  -17.7  -7.4  -39.5  -16.6 
Korea and Taiwan  -9.5  -3.4  -33.3  -12.1 
Hong Kong and Singapore  0.1  0.0  7.5  1.4 
Argentina 6.1  1.7  33.8  9.4 
Bangladesh -0.5  0.0  -4.4  0.4 
Brazil 15.1  5.5  46.3  16.7 
China 0.3  1.8  0.1  0.4 
India -17.1  0.4  -8.1  0.2 
Indonesia 0.8  0.5  2.7  1.7 
Thailand 3.8  1.1  25.0  7.2 
Vietnam 0.8  0.0  13.6  0.3 
Russia -1.4  -0.2  -6.5  -0.8 
Mexico 0.9  1.2  2.5  3.2 
South Africa  0.5  0.1  9.6  1.2 
Turkey -2.0  -0.1  -7.2  -0.3 
Rest of South Asia  -0.6  0.8  -1.3  1.8 
Rest of East Asia  -0.2  0.5  -0.7  1.9 
Rest of LAC  22.9  8.4  30.2  11.1 
Rest of ECA  -1.1  -0.1  -1.8  -0.2 
Middle East and North Africa  0.3  1.0  0.3  0.9 
Selected SSA countries  1.5  0.3  9.1  1.7 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  2.3  0.8  5.4  1.9 
Rest of the World  3.1  1.0  16.4  5.4 
High-income countries  -74.6  -34.2  -19.4  -8.9 
Developing countries (WB)  35.6 24.8  2.9  2.0 
   Middle-income countries  45.3  20.9  5.3  2.4 
   Low-income countries  -9.7  3.9  -2.5  1.0 
   East Asia and Pacific  5.5  3.9  1.1  0.8 
   South Asia  -18.1  1.2  -6.8  0.5 
   Europe and Central Asia  -4.5  -0.3  -4.0  -0.3 
   Middle East and North Africa  0.3  1.0  0.3  0.9 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  4.3  1.1  6.7  1.8 
   Latin America and the Caribbean  45.0  16.7  27.4  10.2 
World total  -39.0  -9.5  -2.4  -0.6 
 






Table 5: Changes in bilateral trade flows from Doha Scenario 4 (agricultural reform plus 
non-agricultural tariff cuts), 2015 
(Difference in bilateral trade flows at FOB prices in 2015 compared to the baseline, $billion)
 a 
 






countries        
Exporter:        Agriculture and food 
World  56 46 9 
High-income  15 15  -0 
Developing  41 31  10 
         Textiles and clothing 
World  41 28  12 
High-income  16 5  11 
Developing  25 23 2 
       Other manufacturing 
World  117 68  49 
High-income  105 60  44 
Developing  12 8  5 
      All merchandise trade 
World  213 142 71 
High-income  135 80  55 
Developing  78 62  16 
 
 
a Aggregations exclude intra-EU trade 
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